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MANAGEMENT OFTHE
EXTERNAL DEBT OF NIGERIA
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administering the national debt,
providing for the repayment of the
principal, payment of interest, and

MR R.A. OLUKOLE

arranging
Debt management has been
defined as a conscious and carefully
planned schedule of the acquisition,

development, and retirement of
external loans contracted either for
development purpose or to support

the balance of

payments.

incorporates estimates

it

of

foreign
exchange earnings, sources of
external finance, the projected
returns from the investments which
the loan has financed, the
amortisation schedule and the debt

the

refinancing

of

providing for an efficient payment
mechanism The analytical aspect,
however, involve the development of
the statistical tools to catry out
sensitivity analysis to explore the

debt obligations outstanding".
Debt management primarily
involves five basic functions: policy,
regulatory,
operational,

managers given market conditions,
and the future structure of e).ternal

accounting,and statistical analysis.

The policy involves coordination
among the agencies with prime

responsibility for the economic
management of a country in the
formulation of national debt policies
and strategies. The regulatory

debt profile in the short term and
reduce the burden of debt servicing
over the medium term.

external debt, monitoring new pebt
incurred by domestic agents (public
& private), and the comprehensive

Debt management also refers to
the.establishment of the conditions
of issue and redemption of public
securities. lt involves the process of

Operationally, debt management
presupposes the adoption of a
strategy to approach and participate

lt also

of the

collecting detailed intormation on
debt on a loan-byJoan basis and

maturing debts. Ralph (1987) says
that debt management is seen as
"any official action by the central
Bank as well as the treasury,
designed to alter the quantity and
kinds of a national government's

includes an
country's
capacity to service existing debt and
a judgment as to the desirability or
otherwise of contracting further
loans. ln broad terms,therefore, the
principal objectives of debt
management are to improve the

service burden.

assessment

in the international financial markets.
requires

The accounting function

aspect of debt

management
concerns the establishment of a well

defined institutional arrangement.for

recording

and monitoring all

recording of maturing

various options open

to

debt

debt.
This paper is arranged in six parts.
Part I is an over-vlew of global debts
selected developed and

in

developing economies. Part ll
addresses the origin and structure
of Nigeria's external debt. Part lll
discusses the causative factors of
Nigeria's external debt and her
external borrowing policy. Part lV
highlights the debt relief proposals
and the Nigeria's external debt

profile. Part

evaluates

V

examines and

the debt

management

strategles adopted in Nigerla while
the last part gives the summary.

debt.
PART

I

OVER.VIEW OF GLOBAL DEBTS
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severely indebted

low-income

is countries (SlLlOs), almost wholly in
not peculiar to Nigeria. One Sub- Saharan Africa, account for
'the. university of its another 9.5% of the debt (see same
appreciales
nature when one considers the Appendix I for list). However, more
growing eliternal debts in the third than half of the countries reporting
world countries of Africa, Asia and to the Debtors Reporting System
Latin America as well as some (DRS) with about 42oA of the debt,
are not severely indebted. They
countries in the Eastern Bloc.
Debt developments differed include 15 moderately indebted
The problem of external debt

of countries middle-income countries (MlMlCs)
during the 1980s and particularly (see same Appendix for list), 3 newly

1991

on officlal debt ln
South Asia, the SlLlCs, and the
"other" group; on private lenders ln
the SlMlCs, NlECs, MlMlCs, Chlna
and lndonesia), as well as
(dependence

differences in the commercial banks

approaches to the different
countries, it is not surprising that
e)fternal debt has developed very
differently

in the 1980s in

these

significantly by groups

country groups.

after 1985, which has affected the industrialised economies (NlECs) of
overall growth and composition of East Asia (Republic of Korea,
developing country debt (see Table Malaysia, and Thailand); 2 large
East Asia Countries (China and
l).

debt of all the country groups
lncreased faidy rapidly to both
private and public creditors. Net

lndonesia), 7 South Asian
economies with low per capita
incomes and, in some cases,

TABLE

I: EXTERNAL

DEBT OFVARIOUS COUNTRY GROUPS

Total

(i)

SLICs

(ii)
(iii)

SIMICs
East Asia

937

tt52

1 r47

DEBT (Vo)
990

1990

L22t

100

4t

73

104

108

tL6

299

500

587

56

588

7t

t42

175

177

195

16.0

85

83

75

84

6.9

9.5
48.2

3NIECs

u

China & Indonesia

25

53

88

98

105

)

3

4

4

6

0.5

38

68

92

102

115

9.4

78

103

r33

134l

t41

11.5

35

51

6L

601

66

5.4

Other East Asia
(iv) South Asia

(v) MIMICs
(vi) Others

Source:- World Debt Table 1990 - 91 Volume

The 20 middlejncome countries

classifled as severely indebted in
1989 (SlMlCs) have drawn most of
the attention ln the debt crisis (see
Apppndk I for list). They account for
about 48% of the total debt of the
country groups in 1990. The 26

increases in official debt, the share
of private loans increased between

Even in the SlLlCs, private debt
continud to increase until 1985,

EXTERNALDEBT
(us $ BTLLToNS)

562

flows from private lenders were falrly
large to evsry group of countries,
except the SlLlCs. Despite large

1980 and '1985, except in the SlUCs.

(US $ BILLIONS AND PERCENT)

COUNTRY GROUP

ln the first half of the 1980s, the

8.6

I

moderate indebtedness; and 34
countries with small individual
amounts of debt. Given the
differences in these countries'
economies, their debt levels at the
beginning of the 1980s, their
e).ternal borrowing policies, and
their different debt structures

largely reflecting the impact of the
depreciating dollar on credlts ln
French Francs. ln South Ash,
lndia's decision to increase lts low

of debt to private lenders
contributed to an lncrease ln the
level

share of prlvate debt ln South Asla,
from 9% ln 1980 to 18% in 1985.

Since 1985 and espechlly ln the
last three y@rs, the experlence of

the varlous country groups

has

diverged slgnificantly, agalnst

an

overall background .of slow growth
of debt and of debt to officld
creditors replaclng debt to prlrrate
creditors. ln the SlLlCs and SlMlCs
commerclal banks reduced thelr
share of total debt after 1985, dter
1987; debt to prlvate credlton
actually fell ln nomlnal terms. Prlvate
het flows of lendlng to the SIUCo

and SlMlCs have been negatlve
since 1987 ad slgnlffcant debfi
reduction has occurred. Mearnvhle,

debt to offfclal credltors
continued

to

rlse. Thls

has

reflecils
continued offlclal lendlng, atUelt at a]
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somewhat slower rate than in the
mid 1980s; the impact of the
dollar's depreciation in 1985-87 and
again ln 1990, and the take-over of
prMate debt by official guarantors.
Actual net transfers on debt to the
SlMlCs were US$- 22.7 billion in

slight improvement
compared with the 1988 net
transfers on debt of US$ -26.7
1989; a

billion. The SlLlCs' net transfer, on
debt were slightly positive in 1989,
continuing the levels of the last few
years. ln both the SlLlCs and the
SlMlCs, these net transfer figures

are inflated by growing

arrears.

Without the increase in interest and

principal arrears, net transfers on
lending to the severely indebted
countries would have been abotft
US$-35 billion in 1989(3).

ln the

non-severely-indebted

countries, debt to private creditors
has developed more along different
lines than in the SlLlCs and SlMlCs,

the NlECs, and China, lndonesia
and South Asia. ln the MlMlCs,
private debt increased during the
1980s but at a decreasing rate. This
reflects both commercial bank

desires

to

reduce exposure

in

developing countries and country
policies designed to slow the growth
of debt.

ln the three NlECs, net transfers
remained fairly large until the
mid-l980s in contrast to the SlMlCs.

Export growth also was

much

higher than in the SlMlCs, reflecting
the diversified export base that the
NIECs had developed through their
outward-oriented growth policy.. ln

the

mid-1980s,

the three NIECs

began a deliberate policy to reduce
their reliance on enernal debt. As a
result, their commercial bank debt

has fallen significantly since 1985,
despite the impact of the dollar's
depreciation on their credits in Yen
The Republic of Korea, whos

US$47.1 billion of debt in 1985 was
nearly the same as Argentina's had
reduced its debt to US$3.1 billion
by 1989.
ln contrast, commercial bank and
other private loans increased
significantly in China, lndonesia, and
the South Asian economies in the
latter half of the 1980s. This reflected
these countries' policy of increased
external borrowing from private
lenders in order to finance
modernization and higher growth

rates. Non- concessional borrowing
from official lenders also increased.
Commercial banks had relatively low
exposure in these countries at the
beginning of the decade and were
willing to increase their lending
despite a general policy of reducing
exposure to developing countries. ln
addition, lndia utilized a number of
instruments to mobilise nonbank
private funds, including non-

1991

PARTII
2. ORIGIN AND STRUCTURE OF
NIGERIA'S EXTERNAL DEBT:

The main reason for ralslng

external

loan by

developlng

countries, lncluding Nigerla, is
invariably to bridge the domestlc
resource gap in order to accelerate
economic development. Such
borrowing is healthy provided the
proceeds are used judlclously for
the purpose for which they were
borrowed and ln such a way as to
facilitate the eventual rspayment
and liquidation of the debt. Nlgerla
started to borrow externally ln order

to

quicken

the pacs of

her

economic development.

2.1: ORIGIN
The origin of Nigeria's external

resident deposits, bonds and
country funds. For all these
countries, the share of long-term
debt to private creditors increased
substantially after 1985. For
example, in South Asia, borrowing
from private sources, including

debt dates back to the

nonresident deposits rose from 180,6
of total debt in 1985 to 24% in 1989.
However, by 1990, domestic policy
changes and external developments
had slowed the growth of private
debt in these countries.
ln the severely indebted countries,
particularly in the SlMlCs, Nigeria
and the SlLlCs the debt, debt

extenslon in the country. The len
has since been full repald. The
external debt remalned relatlvely lor
durlng the oil boom years. lnfact
during that period the country's
foreign exchange posltlon was so
healthy that Nigerla tnd to lend
money to such institutlons as the
lnternational Monetary Fund (lMD

service and growth indices had

been statistically indicated in
Appendix 2. ln respect ol these
countries, the appendix shows debt

outstanding in 1989, the debt
service in 1989, the debt indicators
in 1989 in terms of debt/GNP and
interest/exports as well as average
annual growth rates from 1982-1989.

pre-

lndependence era. Sources from the
Fhance
Federal Mlnistry
indicated that Nigerh contrac-ted her

of

flrst loan from the World Bank

ln
1958. The loan was a relatfuely small

amount of US$28 milllon for rallway

under the "Oil Facllity" ln 1974.
During the oil boom, it was the
general perception that Nlgerh was
relatively " under-borrowed".

Horrrever the poshlon changed
drarnatically in 1977 as ths oll boom
collapsed and was replaced by an
oil glut. The reverses ln our oll
fortunes brought a lot of pressure on

T7
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government finances and
consequently it became absolutely

billion in 1985, $4.6 billion in 1980
and $'1.27 billion in 1978. Much of

to borrow for balance of
payrnents support. This led to the
first major borrowing of $1.0 billion
from the lnternational Capltal
Market i This loan was generally
referred to as the "Jumbo Loan".

the

The loan has a short maturity period
with very high interest rate.
From 1978, our exlernal borrowing

be paid as they fell due and the
depreciation of the dollar vis-a-vis
other key currencies in which most

rose rather sharply. Most of the
loans were raised from private
capital markets as funds from the

were

necessary

increase since 1985

capitalization

of

interest on

existing debt stock which could not

of the debt obligations
contracted.

bilateral and multilateral institutions
were not easy to source. ln order to

further complicate issues, some
State Governments resorted to
borrowlng from external sources to
projects
finance
sorts
regardless of their vhbility. Most of

all

of

the loans were used to

finance

soch! whlte elephant projects which
were unproductive.

multl{ateral in$ltutlons,

the

borrowlngs after 1978 were from
private capital markets with very

The Multilateral Credltors are the

World Bank, the

lnternatlonal
Monetary Fund (lMF) the Afrlcan
Development Bank (ADB) the

15.u7

,,

I-ondon Club

5.600

,,

Promissory Notes

4.584

,,

2.5K

Others

3t.424

,,

t,

lnternational Finance Corporatlon

(FC) and the

Although the World Bank has put
the Nigerh's debt stock as at
31112189
US$32.8 billoin, ths

lnternatlonal
Development Assochtlon (lDA). The
Paris Club of Crcditors represent the

disparity in the above figure and the

official government credltors In
respect of insured debts. The

at

attributed to differences in exchange
time of
rates used

difficulty

computation.

lnternatlona! organisatlons became
reluctant to gtue additional lines of

Nigeria's external debt structure.

Paris Club

World Bank figure could

and when due. This development
lmpalred the lnternational credit
worthlness cf the country as most

conventional dasslflcatlon d the
external debt, largely reflecte the

US$2.087 billion

The sharp decline in oil earnings
as a result of the oil glut led to our
loan obllgotlons. Consequently from
1982, the country started to incur
payment arrears-and also became
lncapaUe d paying her imports as

in the above tables by credltor
groups, whlch ls the brcd

Multilateral Creditors

hlgh Interest rates.

in meeting our external

The composltlon of the debt gtock

TABLE II
Debt Stock as at3lll2lE9

TOTAL

It has to be noted that while the
debts incurred between 1970 and
1978 conslsted mostly of soft
long-term loans from bilateral and

2.2: STRUCTURE:

is

accounted for by the impact of the
variable interest rates at which most
of the eadier loans were contracted,

the

be

at the

As at 31st December, 1990 the
Nigeria's debt stock has increased
by 4.7% from US$1.424 billion in
1989 to US$2.898 in 1990. (See
table lll).
TABLE

London Club of Credltors, however,
represent claimants in respect of
tho
uninsured debts owed
commercial banks. The Promlssory

to

Notes holders are the Credltorc ln
respect of the reflnanced debts for

whlch promlssory notes

were

issued. CIhers lnclude the bllateral

III

Debt Stock as at 31st llecembcr, 1990.

credit to the country.

Multilateral Creditors

Nlgerh's external debt
otrtstandlng stood at US$l.424
billlon as at 31st December, 1989

Paris Club
Promissory Notes

5.861 ,,
4.550 ,,

(see taUe

Others

1.675

ll) compared with $20

1991

US$3.720 billion

17.w2

I-ondon Club

TOTAL

3?,.898

,,

,,

,,
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creditora, supdlers credit and the

propenslty of the Nigerians. Nigerla

estlriates

of belgn

qchngp

private sector cred itors.

had ln the past had

The Nigerh's external debt
structUre could also be classifled

propenshy not only to consume but
also to waste. During the days.of oil

into short, medlum and long term

boorn, we developed exotic and
expenslve tastes, wasted and
squndered resources. Even when
the resources were drying up, the
e)ilravagance continued whlle
expenditure both at the public and

earnlngs as wdl a8 prolecied
returns from lrwe$ments flnenced
with the loans world be recRrlrsd. All
these would hcp to determlne the
ability of tho country to lerulcl,
wtthout undue draln, tfre odsthg
loans and tho deslrabllty or
othendse of contractlng new loans.
ln the Nlgorhn ootten, pedcdady

prlvate sectors was not adlusted to
allgn with our income flow. Hence,
the high accumulation of short term

between 19fl) and 19&1, there was a
general lack of conslderatlon of the
tactors. For lndarrce, the prwlslons

debts.

of

debt. The short term debt ls the debt
tnving an original rnaturity of not

more than one year while the
medium term has a rnaturity of over
one year. The rnaturhy of the long

term debt, howwer, spans over 5
years.

Fudhermore, Nlgerh's external

debt cor.dd be prtvate nonguranteed (external oulgatlon that
is not guaranteed for repayment by
the the Government) or publicly
guaranteed (external obligatlon of
puHic debtor that ls guaranteed for
repayment by the Government) or
puHic debt external obligation of a
public sector estaUlshment like the
Federal or State Govemments).

a

great

(b)

Coupled wlth the poor savlngs
propensity and hlgh consumptlon
pattern is our unreall$h exchange

the

rate. Both
monetary and
exchange rate pdlcl€s of Nlgerla dld

not rcspond qulcldy errcugh to
reflect the external value of the Nalra
at the time when there was a drastlc
decllne in the inflow of resources as

a

result of depressed oll rnarket.
Consequently, the Nalra became
highly overvalued and thls created a

PARTIII

3.

CAUSATIVEFACTORSOF
NIGERH'S EXTERNAL DEBT

It would appear that debt problem

ln Nlgerh became manlfestly
ncticeaUe

ln

1978 when Nigerla

started bonowlng from

the
internatimal cafiital markets (CM).
The ICM loans attracted higher
lnterest rates, had shorta maturhles

and shorter grace perlods. These
loans wero not tlod to speciflc
economlc polects whose rsturns on
lnvestments would rnake the loans
self- liquUatlng.

Faaors that tuve accounted for

our dsbt

proUern

ole

both

endogenous and exogenous.
3.1: ENDOGENOUS FACTORS:

(a)

Flrst

on our external
sector. The existing rate of
exchange at the time made lt
severe pressure

ls the low savlngs

posslble for

lndtuldmls,

corporatbns and even govemments
to irrcur forelgn obllgatlons whlch
the country's resources could not
sustaln and this led to the
accumulatlon, especlally of short
term t,ade debts. The overvaluatlon
also caused leakages and capltal
fllght whlch substantlally dedetod
our extemal reservss.

(c) ln addltlon to the above

is the
management.
ottemal loans

poor external debt
The acqulsltlon

of

shouH nonnally be for dwdopment
purposes
balance of

or for

payments support. ln decidlng on
the optirnal level of bommltments, it
ls expected that a carefully planned
schedude of acquisition, utilization
and retlrement of such loans be

prepared. Moreover,

reallstlc

Decree No. 3O

d

1978 r'hlch

lmposed a celllng of N5.0 blllon on

outstandlng debt at any polnfi ln
tlme, were operily dlsregArded. At
tlmes, both the Federal and $ate
Governments allowed pdldcd

consHeratlons

rather

economlc reasonlng

than
ln

to pronl

determlnlng whlch prolect to firEnce
wlth loan. ConsoquenUy, sotne d
the prolects flnanced wlth sucfi

loans were elther unproductlve or

lacked adequte cost coilld

measures. A number d ntctl
prolects were abendoned bsfort
completlon. ln the erd, the corlrfry
would stlll have to pay br urcfi
lll+oncefued poleds ln tar?rns ol
debt servlclng ar they were frrancrd
by external loang.
(d) Moreover, there ls the

nnrclng

of long term prolect wlth ehod and
medlum term loars. Tho structuro cf
Nlgerla's deH as earlbr obsorvod
tliled in fiavour of short and medlum
term deil ' filch accounted fol
about 85% of total outstandlng debt
ln 1986. Unfortunately, most olthece
medlum loans werg drawn to
flnance long term proJects. Loane
from the lntematlonal capltal markd
lnvarhbly have relatfuely short grace

and rspayment perlod
between ftue to elght ysars. ln
othemords, ln case where the
proJects were extemdly flnanced,
they were hardly comfleted when
periods

29
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amortisation became due A
sitmtion of debt service bunching
then resulted which compounded

has affected adversely the country's
foreign exchange earnings from oll

th€ debt problem.

development in the external sector
has serlously constrained the ability

(e)

Furthermore, there was the
dfuersion of the proceeds of loans
into other uses. Some of these loans
contracted ln the last few years,
especially during the civilian rule,

were reported (according to the
various tribunals) to have been
diverted to other uses instead of
being lnvested in projects for which
they were contracted. To the e!ilent
that such malpractices existed, the
external debt of the country must

have lncreased without

any

in the
offichl assets that would enable the
conespondlng lncrease

country

to

service such

loans

since 1981. This

unfavourable

to amortise our loans and service
our dobts when they fell due.

(b) One other contributory factor to
the Nigeria's e)ilernal debt was the

deprechtion of the US Dollar
against other major international

currencies ln which the orlginal loan
was contracted. Since the Nlgeria's
debt stock is denominated ln the
so-called almighty dollar, the
conversion of debts contracted in

French Franc, Japanese
Deutschemark,

Swiss

Yen,
France,

Pound Sterling etc. into dollar when

the dollar loses hs value will
lncrease the dollar amount

eventually.

of the

debt stock.

(c)

1991

Following the accumulatlon of debts
over the years, h became necessary

Govemment in 1988 to
enunchte external borrowlng pollcy
for the country(4). The obJectlves ol
the policy inglude:
(a) to outllne strategles for

for the

lncreasing foreign

exchange

earnings thereby reduclng the need
for external borrowing;

(b) to set out the crherh for

borrowing from external sourceg
and determine the type of prolectg
lor which elilemat loans may be
obtained;

(c) to outline the mechanlcs for
servicing external debts d the
public and private sectors ol the
Nlgeria economy;

(d) to

outline the rdes and
responslblllties of the varlous orgsng
Fed,eral
State

d the

aN

0 Moreover, Nigerh maintains a
cdture of over-dependence on
imports. The consurRBtion pattern of
most Nigerians had been in favour

Another factor is the
capitallsation of unpakl interest.
Whenever there is a default in the
interest payment, the interest

foreign goods and services,
ttrcreby increasing the lsvel of our

accrued due is always added to the
princlpal thereby increasing the debt

The policy also stipulated the

faelgn exchange commitments. For

stock. Thls was the case when
Nigerh reduced payment of interest

loans:

d

indance, the level of imports
rmched its peak of N13 billion ln
1981.

lt therefore became difficutt to

rcdrce the level of

consbtent with

imports

adverse
development in forelgn exchange
amings ln subsequent years. This
sltuation resulted to a massive bulld

tJp d trade arrears which
mcerbated the external debt

32: EXOGENOUSFACTORS:

due to the London CIub in May 1990

from the contractual rate of about
9.5% of 3%. The default persisted
throughout that year. ln some
cases, penalty interest ls agaln
added to the original interest which
accrued but was unpakl.
(d) Moreover, when variaUe rnarket
bas€d lnterest rate ls the contractual

lmereet rate appllcable

to

a

panbdar loan, the increase ln the
varhUe lnterest rate ln response to
the rnarket sltuatlon constltutes
addllmd burden on the debt

Governments as well as the prhate

ssctor

in the management d

external debts.

procedure

(a)

for

obtainlng forelgn

State Governrnents

and

Parastatals and the prlvate soctor
must obtaln Federal Govemmeril
approval before contraA[p freoh

loans. Contracts of

profec'tc

requiring oxternal flnanclng shor.ild
therefore not be slgned by the State
Governments and Parastatals untl
there is assumnce that the requlred

elternal loan would be guaranteed

by the

Federal

Approval by

Government.

the

Govemment for the

Federal

prfuate sector

problern.

borrowing wll not constltuts a
Federal Govemment of Nlgorh
guarante€ or currency undertaHng]
by applles solely to ensure that the

o<cfiange eamer slnce early 1970s

33: EXTERNAL BORROWING

external borrowlng conforms wlth

has been crude oI. Unfortunately,
the dtrt ln the lntemational market

POLICY:

natlonal obloctlves and prlorities.
(b) State Governments may obtaln

(a) Apart from the above, there was

tho dedlnlng forelgn
emlngs.

e(change
Nlgerla's malor foreign

P,
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external loans only after obtalning
Federal Govemmeil consent that lt
would guanntee the loan. Potential
exterid credltors are therefor
advised not to grant external loans
to State Gorernments and their
parastatals without the Federal
Govemrnent backlng.

(c) Alleternal bonorlng proposals
of SAte Gorernments ln a fiscal year

should be submltted ln good time to
the Foderal Mlnlstry of Finance and
Economlc Development for vening
and lncorporatlon ln the external
borrorlng programme of the publlc

debit of their accounts wlth the
CBN, the Naira equlvalent of
payments due pre-SFEM, and
transactions covered by the
rescheddlng agreements. With
regard to all other transactlons, all
public sector institutions lncluding
State Goremments and Federal
Parastatals should servlce thelr

debts through the

Forelgn

Exchange Market and promptly
inform the Federal Mlnlstry of

Finance and

Economlc

Economlc Development and the
Central Bank of Nlgeria before

Developrnent for record purposes.
(b) Statee or Parastatals whlch fail
to servlce thelr loans will have the
Naira equlvalent deducted at source
before the balance of the share of
the proceeds in the Federatlon
Account ln the cass of States, and
budgetary allocation for parastatals,

negotlatlon wlth the creditors.

ls

sector in the Annual Budget.
All forelgn loan agreements
should flrst be dlscussed with the
Finance and
Federal Minlstry

(d)

cf

As

regnrds drawing, the
statod that provlslon should be
rnade ln Loan Agreements for new
loans to be guarantsed by the
pollcy

Federal Goremment, specifying that
both tho creditor and the borrower

ohorrld forward advlce

on

drawdowns to the Federal Ministry
d Fhance and Economic

tli/oloprnent. Also, states and
Prra*ltals can draw on exlstlng

laru

ag the need arlses but they
shorJd knmedlatdy send coples of
hfrudbrte on such draw- downs to
the Federd Mhlstry of Flnance and
Ecmomlc Dorelopment for record

relesed.

(c) ln th€ case of loans that are
on{ent by the Federal Government
to State Gorernments, the Federal
Ministry of Flnance and Economic
Developrnent will rnake the due
payments and deduct the full
amowt at source from the statutory
allocatbn.

(d)

As for private sector

l@ns,

lndustrles that are export- oriented
should senrlce their debts from their
export eamlngs whlle others should
utilize the Foreign Exchange Market
(FEM) facllitles for servlclng their

p.ymants to credltors are
prcmpdy made thereby avoiding

th.t

ponaky cfnrges, State Government

and thelr agoncle as well

as

Fedofral Parastatals should make
arralaUe to tho CBN dlrectly or by

problems became uddely
recognlsed by eady 19q1,
advocates of lnnovatlve adtilon pt
fonrard a number of dcil rellel
proposals. Thelr schemc were
dlvlded benreen those hvorlng
solutlons through an lncrane ln
debt and those lavourlng edtrtlons
that would reduce tt thus crathg
dfuergent vlars.
Those favourlng lncrease h debt
saw debt proHems as be[tg
problems of llllquldlty capaUe of
belng eased and eventually rerolved
by an increase ln lendlng. One of the

leading proponents of thls lg lord
lncrease ln lendlng. One ol the
leading proponents of thls 18 t-ord
Lever (19e1) who advocated a
substantlal lncrease ln borowlng
officially guarantee by the E eon
Credit Agencies. Some ol the Beort
Credit Agencles lndude
Export-lmport Bank of U.S.A ECGD

of

U.K. and Hermes

d

WeEt

Germany.

By contrast, debt reduclng
schemes focused on debt sohrgncy.

Their proponents argued that
withoul an easlng of the debt
burden, rnany countries wqdd be
unable to recover flnanchl drength.

They clalmed both debtore and
creditors would be better ecnred by

agreelng to an eady financhl
reconstructlon. They b€llo/sd

uotid restorc domeatb
to Ute debtor oourtrho,
lmprove the Cobal economy end

agreementt

debts.

growth
PARTIV

purpo8e8.

On repayrnents, the policy mado
tfn fo$owlng pro/slons:(a) Fq the puryoces of ens0rlng

1991

4. THE DEBT RELIEF
PR,OFOSAIS AND THE
NIGERH'S EXTERNAL DEBT
PR,OFILE:

lnternatlonal supervislon.

(i)

4.1: THEDEBTRELIEF

PROPOSAIS:
As the critical nature

offer the credltors the proopcc-tr d
eventually recorrerlng a rcldrdy
hlgher proportlon of thelr lcndhg t
negothted under aprprophte

d debt

Peter Kenen and Fdk Rohat)"r
(1983) proposed "the creatlon cf
anew lnternatlonal Agency to tako
dalms ryed to commerchl banla
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and have responsibility for adiusting
terms with the debtors". The initial

cost would be borne by

banks,

which would sell their loan to the
Agency at a discount. However, the
residual credit risk would then be
passed to the Agency and its official
shareholders. These early schemes

required support and financial
commitment at a level that was not
politically feasible. They lost as
global economic recovery was set in

form mid 1983. However, the slow
down of the Wodd economy after
1984 aM the failure of the problem
debtors to resume adequate growth
resulted in another round of debates
and proposals on the debt issue.

creditor banks and the multilateral
agencies, the rates of return on new
lending would be so high to lustify
such new lending However, the
assumption became unrealistic as
little or no lending took place ard
even countries that made positive
achievements on their own were not
favoured by new resource transfers.

The Bakers Plan was generally
believed to be unrealistic because
the new lending, even if it
materialised, would have made no

visible impact because

it

small fraction of the

was

a

interest

payments due during the period. But

the plan did ensure that the debtor
countries would continue to render
their obligations once they accepted

(ii) The Baker Plan:
One of such proposals put forurard
was that of James A. Baker lll

(1985),

the U.S.

Secretary of

Treasury, after whom tfie proposal
was designated as Baker Plan. The

plan, among others, proposed that
private banks should be encouraged
to commit a total of $20 billion in net
new lending over three years to

support economic adjustment

programmes. The plan also
envisaged that the 15 highly

indebted countries (including
Nigeria) identified under the
programme would receive an

additional $9 billion net lending from

the multi-lateral development banks
in 1986-1988 in support of their
market oriented policies. Countries
that wanted to participate in the
scheme would, however, undertake
IMF-supported structural adjustment

programmes

and

implementation
was to continue to be on the basis
of the case by caseapproach to the
debt problem. One fundamental
assumption of the Baker Plan was

that if the debtor countries adopted
growth-oriented adjustment policies
supported by new net lending by the

that their economies must grow in
order to sustain their debt service
capacity. ln recent years, one of the
leading proposals on the debt issue,
which has caught the awareness of
both creditor and debtor countries,
alike, and has introduced a new

dimension

in the

international
financial system, was the proposal
on the debt issue put fonruard by the
US. Treasury Secretary, Nicholas
Brady.

(iii) The Brady Plan:
The Brady Plan, which came early in
1989 after the Baker Plan of 1985,
contained two features of the latter.
First, it maintains the use of the case
by case approach and, second, it
insists that other agreements were
then under discussion. (5)

ICF would be financed iointly

(eligibility being determined by the
need and the debtor's commitment
to an adjustment programme). The

bY

governments, international financial
insthutions and banks on the basis
of their respective exposure to the
debtor, and would be managed by
lMF. lt would limit interest rates to a
pre-agreed level, but allow for a
recovery of earlier unpakl interest if
rates subsequently fell belor this
level.

(v)

John Lefake (1987) proposed
the creation of an intematlonal debt
adjustment facility to purchase a
country's loan at a discount in the
secondary market and to restructure
them to pass on the benefit of the

discount

to the debtor. The

purchase programme would be
initiated by a request from the
country but only after agreement on
a detailed plan of future economic
management. The facility wquld also
seek to use debt equrty swaps and
commodity-linked bonds to expand
the degree of restructuring.

(vi)

Jeffery Sachs

of

Harvard

University has proposed that the
existing debt of countries wllling to

participate

in an

internatlonally

supervised adjustment programme
should be subordinated to any new
lending made once the programme
was in force. The new debt, llmlted
in any one year to five percent of

total existing debt, would be
denominated

in

negothuel

instruments (e.g. bonds).
subordinated old debt
marketability

(iv) Alfred Herrhausen suggested
that creation of an "lnterest
Compensation fund (lCF)" to
stabilize and limit the interest
payments of eligible countries

1991

of the new

The
and
are

designed to broaden the investor
appeal of the new lnstruments and
so stimulate new lending.

(vii) The Paris Club Plan (1987) has
essentially two rnain features. lt
requested the creditor governmontd
to waive repayrnent of past debt b{

l
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converting them into grants for low

income debtor countries pursuing

it did not allow

(b) The Enhanced Structural
Adlustment Facility (ESAF) was
established with some SDR 6 billion
and became effective in January
1988. lt was designed to provide
much larger amounts of financial
assistance to qualifying countries

previously

(lDA-eligible countries implementing

structural reforms. lt also called for a

of

interest on officially
guaranteed debt below market rate
and to reschedule such debts over a
longer period of up to twenty years.
However, the major limitation of this
reduction

plan was that

rescheduling of

IMF -

rescheduled debts.

(viii) The African Development Bank
proposal (1987) was tailored strictly
to African debts. This plan sought to
convert Africa's medium and long
term securities of at least twenty
years maturity at fixed interest rate
below the market rate; and to
establish a redemption fund into
which debtor countries would make
annual payment over the twenty

year period, which

would

the period to the
loan that would be

accumulate over

amount of
outstanding at maturity, Through
this fund, it was envisaged that
sufficient funds would have been
built up in the redemption fund to

ensure that the
securities

approved

structural

adjustment programmes) in the
other of 150 per cent of members'
quota over a three-year period, and
in some cases up to 350 per cent of
quota where the need arises.

(x) The World Bank
The Structural Adjustment Lending
was initiated in 1980/1981 The

initiative was designed to be
supportive of the Bank's Project
lending. lt has however provided
some assistance to many subSaharan countries. ln 1985, a US$1

were liquidated

at

that interest rate risks

were

completely shifted to them. Second,
J.O. Osakwe (1989) observed that
"the plan excluded debt owed the
multilateral institutions ac well as
concessional bilateral loans which
constituted the greater proportion of

the debt of most

African

countries"(6)

ln 1986 the

Structural

Adjustment Facility (SAF) was
established to provide assistance on

African countries amounting to. as
much as US$1 billion.

(xii) The Toronto terms for offrcial
bilateral rescheduling
At the Toronto economic summlt ln
June 1988, the leaders of seven
industrial countries (the Group of 7,
7) agreed that th€
or G
non-concessional bilateral officia!
debt of low-income (defined as IDA
only) African countries could be
rescheduled at the Paris Club under

a. Menu that would include
concessional options. Those
options were refined by the Parls
Club and announced by the G-7 at
the 1988 World Bank - IMF Annual
Meetings in Berlin. ln 1990, Toronto
terms were extended to IDA-On|Y
countries outside

Af

rica.

Under the Toronto Terms, all

billion sub-Saharan African Facility

rescheduled concessional debt is to

be repaid with a 25 year maturity
including a 14 year grace.

countries in the subregion.

Moratorium interest charges would
be at least as low as the rates on the
original loans. (ln fact, much of the
concessional debt to low-income
Africa owed to countries of the
OECD is being cancelled). For
nonconcessional debt, the creditor
countries would choose repayment
conditions from a Menu of three

(xi) Other New lnitiatives
(a) On December 7, 1988, the
Soviet President, Mr Gorbachev, in
his address at the United Nations,
stated that the USSR was prepared
to institute moratoria of up to 100
years on debt servicing by the least
developed countries and, in quite a
few cases, to write off the debt
altogether

(b) ln May 1989, Presidend
Mitterand of France announced a
proposal to cancel some US$2.3

billion owed to France by low
income African countries upon

(ix) The IIvIF

also announced that the United
States would forgive economic
assistance loans to sub-Saharan

was established by the Bank to
provide assistance to low income

outstanding

maturity. The ADB plan, like other
plans, has its limitations. First, the
creditor banks were reluctant to
accept the scheme on the ground

(a)

very concessional terms to very low
income (l DA-eligible) countries.

1991

approval bay the French parliament.

options.

Option A' Cancel one third of
eligible maturities and-reschedule
the remainder with a 14 Year
maturity including an 8 year grace.
Moratorium interest would be based

on Market interest rates

(reflecting

different creditor agencies' cost of
borrowing)

(c) ln July 1989, President Bush Option B

Adopt

the

longer
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repayment applid to concessional
debt (25 year maturity with a'14 yeat
grace) and base moratorium interest
on market rates.

Option C:. Charge moratorium
interest rates somewhat below
market rates and require repayment

with

a

'14 yeat maturity with

an

8

year grace.
The consolidation periods for debt
service eligible for these

reschedulings have been in the
range of 12 to 36 months.
ln 1988-90, Paris Club creditors
holding about 29 per cent of eligible

in 1970 with a
staggering increase to US$99,539
million in 1980, US$91,715 million in
1982 and slumped to US$88,468
million in 1983, recovered to its 1982
US$13,170 million

level in 1984 when it recorded
US$91,590 million. The GNP
slumped again to US$88.167 million
in 1985, US$5,e9 million in 1986
and plummeted to US$23,073 in
1987, US$27,855 million in 1988 and
US$27,515 million in 1989(8). There

was

a

negative current account
balance in 1970, 1982, 1983, 1987,
1988 and 1989.

The ratio of the total debt service

those
representing 26 per cent of eligible,
non-concessional debt have chosen

export of goods and
services (XGS) i.e. TDS/IXGS was
4.2o/o in 1980. lt rose to an
unfavourable figure of 16.27o in
1982, 23.8o/o in 1983 and 33.8olo in

option B; and those holding the

slight

debt of this 12

countries

rescheduling at Toronto terms have

chosen Option A;

remaining 45 per cent have chosen
Option C.(6)
4.2: Nigeria's External DebrProfile:

The total external debt of Nigeria in
198O was an infinitesimal amount of

ODS)

to

1984. There was a

improvement to 33.3olo in 1985,
32.6%o in 1986 and a much better
figure of 13.304 in 1987. The ratio,
however, unfavourably rose sharply
lo 29.Oo/o in 1988 but fell lo 21.3"/o in

lggg

r

US$8,934 million which rose by
about 45olo to US12,954 million in
1982 and further surged to
US$18,539 million in 1983 with a
slight reduction to US$18,537 million
in 1984 and a modest increase to
US$19,551 million in 1985.The debt
stock, however, escailted to
US$24,043 million in 1986, soared to
US$31,193 million in 1987 with a
marginal increase to US$1,947
million in 1988, which rose to
US$32,832 million in 1989(7). (see

The ratio of the total debt stock
(EDT) to export of goods and
services (XGS) i.e. EDT/I(GS was
very modest at 32.2o/o in 1980.

Appendix 3).
As regards aggregate net resource

in 1980. lt

flows and net translers (long{erm),
Nigeria had a negattve net transfer
of resources in 1970, 1980, 1984,
1985, 1986 and 1988. On her major

economic aggregates,

Nigeria's
Gross National Product (GNP) was

Unfavourably,

it however

staggered

to 100.4% in 1982, 170.8o/o in 1983
and 150.1% in 1984.1t improved
marginally to 144.60l" in 1985, further

worsened

to

380.5olo

in

1986,

399.0% in '1987 and 437.4oA in 1988.

There was

a slight

improvement in

1989 when it recorded 390.1

o/".

The ratio of total debt stock to the
GNP (EDT/GNP) was as low as 9.0%

unfavcurably rose to

in 1982,21.0Y" in 198i!,2O.2oA
in 1984 and 22.2ctb in 1985. lt further
escalated to an undesirable figure of
52.7oA in 1986 aM an embarrassing
figure of 135.2% in 1987. The ratio
'14.1o/o

fell to an improved ligure of 114.7%
in 1988 and rose marginally to a less

acceptable ratio of 119.306 in 1989
(See Appendix 3).
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5. DEBTMANAGEMENT
STRATEGIES IN NIGERIA,:

Conscious and discerniHe eftoils

to adopt debt rellef
measures following the

were made

accumulation of trade debt arrears

in

1983 during which time the
available lines of credit to Nigeria
had been blocked for lack of

necessary foreign exchange
resources to pay the import bills

when due.

The most popular debt

relief

measures adopted were refinancing,

rescheduling and restructuring of
debt arrears. lt would, however,
appear most instructMe to define at
the onset these three debt relieving
strategies:

(a) Refinancing is an arrangement
whereby a debtor takes a new loan
to pay off an existing debt. The new
loan may be provided by the same
group of creditors or by a new set of
creditors. Repayments of such debt,
which are usually negotiatcd wlth
the creditors, are embodled ln a
Loan Agreement.

(b)

Rescheduling is not merely
postponing a debt; it is stretching
out or elongating for a number of
years the repayment period of a
debt which is due in one year. Therp
is, of course, a cost involved; the
debtor country must pay interest on
the amount outstanding until the

debt has been finally and fully
repaid. The rationale for a
rescheduling is to buy time. ln cases
where the debt problems are due to

temporary foreign

exchange

shortfall, rescheduling gives time for
the balance of payrnents to improve.
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ln cases where the problem is more
fundamental, rescheduling lightens
the country's burden and gives time
for appropriate corrective measure
to be taken in order to improve the
balance of payments.
(c) Restructuring is an arrangement

under which the existing debt stock

could be converted to

various
categories of debt. Such conversion
could consist of a buy-back,

issuance of collateralised bond and
provision of new money.
5.1: Refinancing o[ Trade Arrears
1984 - 1988:

The growth of short term liabilities

in the form of trade
arrears became a problem
especially

beginning from 1982. At that time
also, Nigeria's foreign creditors had
started to refuse the opening of new

lines of credit. lt therefore became
necessary to seek debt relief by

refinancing

the trade

arrears.

Consequently, agreements were
reached to refinance arrears in
respect of confirmed leters of credit
(UCs) outstanding as at 13th July,
1983. UMer the agreement, a total
of US$2,112 million worth of UCs
was refinanced.(9)

The main features of

the

agreement included 6 months of
grace and repayment period of 30
months beginning from January,
1984. lnterest was fixed at 11l2ob
above LIBOR. Full repayments of
the refinanced arrears have been
made since July, 1986.

especially those an open account,

bills for collection,

unconfirmed
letters of credit and some invisible
trade transactions through the
insurance of promissory notes

The terms of the agreement
contained in the Trade Debt Circular
issued on 18th April, 1984 included
the payment of interest at the rate of
1olo above LIBOR with effect from
January, 1984; maturity period of 6

years including
2112 years and

5.2: Refinancing and Restructuring
Agreement with the l-ondon Club on
23rd November, 1987:

INCORPORATED DEBT
A Principal payment shall constitute
incorporated Debt if and only 1{ il is

a grace period of

the redemption of the

promrssory notes in 14 equal
quarlerly instalments with effect
from October, 1986 The notes
could also be redeemed rn local

currency Naira, on terms agreeable
to the Nigerian authority Moreover,
as a result of further negotiation in
1987, payment was elongated to 88
quarterly instalments starting from
5th April, 1988 to the year 2010 The
first 8 quartedy instalments were
paid at the rate of 5olo per annum or
1.25o/o per quarter The remaining 80
instalments were to be made al 8o/o
per annum or 2o/o per quarter. On
the payment of the 80th instalment
the obligation would have been fully
discharged
The amounts of promissory notes
issued from 1984 to 1988 are stated
in the table 3 below.

5.2. 1 :

an Eligible Principal Payment and
(on a date earlier than 1st April,
1988) the lnternational Agent has
received

(a) a Restructuring Notice

covering
such Eligible Principal Payment and
signed by the Republic and the

creditor

(b) a

Restructuring Certificate

covering all such Eligible Principal
Payments which are owed to such
creditor and signed by the Republic
and such creditor.
5.2.2:

RESTRUCTURING
NOTICES:

The Republic shall procure that
there are prepared and delivered to
the lnternational Agent ln respect of

each creditor

to whlch

EligiHe

Principal Payments are owed and

which provides the

requisite
information to the RepuUic.
(a) one or more duly completed

Restructuring Notice covering all

TABLE3
STOCK OF PROMISSORYNOTES ISSUEDAS

AT19tt

$

ln spite cf the refinancing exerc,ise,
the arrears continued to mount and
thus increased the level of

indebtedness. lt thus became
expedient to secure further relief on
debt burden. Accordingty, a
decision was reached in 19g4 to
refinance the remaining arrears

1991

1984

258,47t,678

1985
1986

\050,t?n,541
?n2,M,227

1981

7,6U,397,676

19tt8

650,939,204
3,8/.5,9L4,3?5

Capitalised Interest

AL

l,M5,3fl.l,3y
4,89L,295,ffi

35

VOLUME 15NO.2

APRIUJI,JNE

such Eligible Principal

1991

5.2.5: DATE OF AGREEMENT
AND AMOUNT OF DEBT:

Payments which are owed to srch
creditor and slgned by the RepuUlc

Restructuring Certificate
covering such Restructuring Notices.

The Refinancing and Restructuring
Agreement was signed on the 23rd

and such creditor.

5.2.3:REPAYMENT OFTHE
LOANS

November, 1987

5.3.2: RESTRUCTURING

Principal

Payments;and

b) a

The Republic shall reduce the
outstanding amount o each loan
during each period specified below
by four eqml instalments on each
Repayment Dates falling during

aM

became

effective that date.
On the 1Sth December, 1987 when
the Refinancing and Restructuring

Agreement became operative, the
total value of letters of credit debts
and restructured loans was:

such period such that the aggregate
reduction in the outstanding amount

NOTICES

The RepuUlc shall procur€ that
there are prepared and dellvered to
the lnternatlonal Agent ln respec{ of

each creditor to whlch

Principal (Incorporated
Payable Debts (Uncapitalised Interest)
Restructured Loans

of such loan rnade durlng

such
p€rcentage

period is equal to the
specified below of the amount of

EllglUe

Principal Payments are owed and
78
511,014,408.41

2,753,072,N.92

j,br6,iBb,225.ii

TOTAL

such loan on the day it was made:
PERCENTAGE R,EDUCTION

PERIOD

which
information to the Republic.

1991 to March, 1992

t5%

(a) one or more duly complded
Restructuring i,lotices coverlng all
such EliglUe Prlnclpal Payments;

April,1992 to March,
1993 to March, 1994
L994 to March, 1995

20%

and

April,
April,

1990 to March, 1991

s%

1993

April,
April,
April,

1995 to

March,

20%

(b) a

20%

covering such Restructuring Notlces.

1996

20Vo

Aprilq 1995 to March, 1996

20%

5.3.3:

Restructuring Certlffcatp

REPAYMENT OFTHE
LOANS

5.2.4: INTEREST PERIODS

The duration of each interest

period shall

be three

months

provided that:
(a) any interest period which begins
during or at the same time as any
other interest period shall end at the
same time as that other interest

period;and
(b) any interest period which begins
before 15th March, shall end on that
date; and

(c) any lnterest Period which would
otheruise eldend beyond, or end
during the month preceding the
tenth Business day of any January,
April, July or October shall be such
duration that it shall end on that date.

53: REFINANCING AND
RESTRUCTUR.ING AMENDMENT
AGREEMENT WITH THE
LONDON CLUB ON 22ND MARCH,
19t9.
5.3.1: INCORPORATED DEBT:

A

principal payment

shall

constitute incorporated Debt if and
only if it is an Eligible Principal
Payment and (on a date earlier than
30th June, 1989) the lnternational
Agent has received:

(a) a Restructuring Notice covering
such Eligible Principal Payment and
signed by the Republic and the
creditor.

(b) a Restructuring Certiftcate
corering all such EligiUe Prlnclpa!

The RepuHic shall reduce the
outstanding amount of each lon

during each Calendar yesr
mentloned below by eqtnl
instalments on each of tho
Repayment Dates falllng durhg
such Calendar yoar, the amount of
those instalments belng such loan
made during such Calendar year ls
equal to the percentage speclfl€d
below of the amount of such l-oan
on the day h was rnade:

PERIOD

PERCENTAGE

REDUCrION
1992to2fr03

3Vo

2004 to 2008

12.8Vo
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Repayment date from 1Oth January,
1992 and
each April, July,
October and January thereafter up
to and including October,20O8.

in

5% Down Payment should be
made to the Decapitalising Banks
(banks that did not add accrued
interest to the principal amount)
5% as Down Payment

1st lnstalment on 15/4/89 and each
subsequent Calendar month up to
and including December, 1991.
5.3.4:

banks made

the
specified percentage of the original

involving

principal amount is repai<J by four

12.8% in each

aM interest and tradltlmal
rescheduling scheme.
The Nigerian side responded wlth
a term sheet which included, among
other things, the following proposels:

(c) The Applicable Margin for the
UC Principal, for the Medium Term
Debt and Payable Debt shall be

total debt to be bought back and th€
balance of the debt to be converted
to Bonds.
(ii) Price: 31.50 Cents per Ddlar

equal instalments during that year.
1992
year

to 2003

2004 to
year

2008

(12)
(5)

3% in each

The duration of each interest
period shall be one month provkled
that:

AMOUNT RESCHEDULED
UNDER RESTRUCTURING
AMENDMENT AGREEMENT
DATED 23R189:

5.3.7:

(a) Refinanced UCs amounted

and

$2.4 billion while the

month shall be of such duration that
it shall end on that day.

ln

summary th€ ldlowlng terms
apdied to the PayaUe Debt ard the

Buyback: Minimum of 65% of

(iii)

Payable

Debt:

Prevlous

to

repayment
period was between 1992 and 2003;
(b) Payable Debt amounted to $500

Million while the repaym€nt perid
was between 1989 ard 1991.
Bestructured Loans (medium/long
term debt) amounted to $2.8 blllon
and th€ repaym€nt perlod wag

behreen 1992 and

an8.

The

(iv) Collateralization: Principal and a
12 month interest collateralization to
be provided to banks that wonld
tender 65%
more
thelr
outstanding debt for buyback. There
would be no collateralization for

or

of

interest arrears.

(v)

Payment of Arrears: 20% of the
arrears to be pakl up-front, while the
balance of 8O% to bespread ovsr a
period of time.

(vi) lnterest Rate: 6% and to be
made retroactive to 15th Aprll, 1990.

The

commercial banks

however,

not

responded

had,

to

the

PAYABLE DEBT:

Refinanced UCs are prfuate sector
debts (short term debt) whf,b the
Bestructured Loans are puUic deils

There should be 5% Down

(medium/long term debts).

THE LONDON CLUB IN MARCH,
r99l . AGREEMENT IN PRINCTPLE:

Payment upon signature of the 1989

Amendment Agreement. The
balance should be paU in
equal-monthly lnstalments, lst
instalment should be paU in April,
1

(i)

proposals before the year ended.

lncorporated Debt.
5.3.5:

principal

positions to be maintained

(a) any interest period which begins
during or at the same time as any
other interest shall end at the same
time as that other interest period;

(b) any interest period which would
othenrise extend beyoM the
fifteenth Business Day ln any one

a countsr pIOpCal,
debt buyback fr<ed
interest bonds, cdlateraltsed

in 68 quartedy instalments so that in

each year mentioned below

718%per annum.

INTEREST PERIODS:

1991

989 up to 31 st December,

1

991

.

5.3.6: INCORPORATED DEBT:

(a) UC Principal to be pail in 144

equal montHy

lnstalrnents,
and

@lnnlng ln Jantnry, tSZ

endlng ln December, AX)3.
(b) Medium Term DeH ro be repai,

5.4: DEBTRESCHEDULING
NEGOTIATIONS WITII THE
IONDON CLUB IN I99G

ln

March, 1990, Nigeft put
foruard a debt servics reductlon
proposal before the London Oub,
s,hlch opened up a sorleo d
negptlatlons throlghon the yar.
Essentlally, the proposal orulsagpd
the converslcn of all dobf owed to
the commerclal banks lnto a g0 year

bond, wlth ten years graoe, et an
interest rate of 3% per annum. The

55: DEBT I{EGOTIATIONS WITH

lst March, 1991, Agreernont was
reached in principle on proposals
for the distinct, voluntary, optlons
availaUe to Nigeria's bank credlor.
This Agreement was sublect to
On

subsequent ratif icatlon

:

Option A

- Buyback

Option B

- Collaterlsed Bonds
- New Money Bonds.

Option C

Eligible Debt was defined

as
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Rdevant Debt and PayaUe Debt
odstandlng at the end of October,

1991

5.5.5: Base Debt Bonds
5.5.3: Option B - Collateralised Bonds

Base Debt ls the EllglUe Debt, tthlch

1990.

(a)

Collateralised bonds will be
issued at par in exchange tor

forms the basls d new money
commltment, will be exchanged at

Relevaril Debt was also definod to

Eliglble Debt.

par for Bonds on the followlng torms:

lndude principal amounts o,Yd

(b) Obligors - The Federal RepuUlc

under

the 1989 Restructuring

Agreement

and the

Refinancing

of

Nigeria (FGN) and the Central

Bank of Nigeria (CBN).

Amendment.

(c)

The Credltors will be required to
cornmlt the full amount of the
eligible Debt to one or more d the

Bonds, Listing

Form and Listing

-

Registered

will be on

the

Luxembourg Stock Exchange.
(d) Currency - US Dollar
lnterest - 6.25% pa. payaHe

(e)

optlons.

semi-annually.

A - Buyback
(a) Nigerh will offer to purchase
EligiHe Debt from the creditors at a

5.5.1: Option

fixed price in US Dollar.

(b)

Nigeria may repurchase about

60% of the cligible debt. However,
Nigeria may purchase more than
60% of the Eligible Debt as long as it
is done at the same fixed price and
all other relevant conditions are
satisfied.

(c)

Priority shall

be given to

creditors tendering 100% owed to
them where the amount of the debt
does not exceed US$20 million.

(d) Each succqssful

creditor who

tendered EligiUe Debt shall
exchange the EllgiUe Debt for

Deferred Purchase Loans ln the
amount d such EligiUe Debt urder
the Loan hcllity.
5.5.2: Deferred Purchase I-oan

Facility

Obligors - The Federal RepuHic of
Nlgerh (FGN) and the Central Bank
of Nigeria (CBN)
Currency - US Dollar C;ash

Amount - Aggregate amount
payaUe for Eligible Debt which is
successf ully tendered.

Cdlateral - US DollarCash

-

lnteresfi
Loan repayable with
accrued lnterest at,the rate of roturn
obtalned on the collateral.

0

Repayment

- Single repayment

(c)

Interest - UBOR plus

Zero

coupon boMs.
Repurchase - Opportunity to
repurchase bonds only if there is no

13/16%

p.a. payaUe seml- anntnlly.

(d)

Repayment - 10 years grace and
years
repayment
10
(e) Form - Bearer Bonds.
Debt Converslon - Base Debt

0

Bonds

30 years after 1/1 1/90

(g) Collateral - US Treasury

(a) OUlgors - The Federal RepuUlc
(FGN) and the Central
Bank of Nigerh (CBN)
(b) Currency - US Dollar

of Nigerh

are

ellgiUe

for

debt

converslon.

(h)

5.5.6: Interest and Payable Debt

default in interest payment.
(i) Debt Conversion - The Bonds will
be eligible for debt conversion

(a) lnterest on Relevant Debt acrued
brrt unpald at 31/10/90 shall bo
payable.
(b) PayaUe Debt due but unPaH at
payaUe. No
31/10/90 shalt

5.5.4: Option C - NewMoney Bonds

interes wlll be pa)raHe on PaYaUe

(a) Obligors - The Federal Republic
of Nigeria (FGN) and the Central

Debt due on or before 31/10/90.

Bank of Nigerh (CBN)

(b) Currency - US Dollar
(c) Amount - 10% of the Eligible
Debt will be cornmitted to this option.

Participation in the nai/ money
option is sublect to a minimum cf
US$S million. However, a bank with

less than US35 million may
participate if it commits all lts
EllgiUe Debt.

(d) lnterest

-

LIBOR plus 1% P.a.
payable semi- annually.
(e) Repayment 7 years grace and
8 years repayment semi-annuallY.
(f) Form - Bearer Bonds. ln case of
bonds of less than US$20 mlllion,
creditors will provide loans.
(g) Debt Conversion - New Money

-

Bonds or loans will be ellglUe for
debt conversion.

bo

(c)

lnterost ghall eccnrc form
1/11/$ - 3l/3/91. lrilorest rate ls
6.25% for Relevant Debt end
ortstandlng PayeUe OoU h case of
Optlom A and B rnd h cerc ol
Optlon Cat UBOR plus 13/16i5 P.e.

(d)

Frorn 1l4lg1, lntered

shall

aocrue and bo payatle on Relarant
DoU rnd outstsndhg'PaPUe DcH
as sp*lfled ln (C) abole.
(e) No intered on lntered wtl be
p6yaue; but lntoreEt wll be payaue
at the contractual non- dehdt ratos.

5.5.7: Amount d DeH lnvdved: The
amount of debt lnvdved under thls
Agreementwas abottt i,15.8 bllbn.
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be rescheduled or refinanced.

5.6.5: De-Minimis Clause:

(b)

All debts less than

5.6.1: Debts Concerned:
(a) . Commercial credits guaranteed

of Pre '84 Short Term
Private Sector debts will be

or insured by the Government of the
participating Creditor Countries or
their appropriate institution, having
an original maturity of more than
one year pursuant to a contract or

rescheduled or refinanced.

other financial

arrangement

100%

(c) 90% of Post '83 Short Term
Private Sector debts will be
rescheduled or refinanced.

1991

SDRl,000,0m

should be paid in cash.

5.7:

PARIS CLUB

RESCHEDULING

2ND
AGREEMENT

1989:

The date of the Agreement
5.6.3: Repayment Scheduled:

March 3, 1989:

(a)

5.7. 1 : Debts concerned:

was

concluded before October 1, 1985.

extended

to the

Federal

Government of Nigeria, extended to
one of the Federated States, or
extended to a public entity wholly
owned by the Federal Republic of

Nigeria or by one of its federated
or with a guarantee of
payment from one or several of

states,

these entities;

or extended to the prMate sector
in Nigerh, as far as arrears as at
September 30, 1986 are concerned.

(b)

Loans from Governments or
appropriate institutions of the

Participating Creditor Countries,
having an original maturity of more
than one year, pursuant to an

agreement concluded
October, 19&5.

extended

to the

before
Federal

Government of Nigeria, extended to
the Federal States, or
one
extended to apublic entity wholly

of

Medium Term

commercial
credits and Public Sector Loans will
be pakl in 10 equal and successive
semi- annual payments, the first
payment to be made on November
15, 1992 and the final payment to be
made on May 15, 1997.

agencies having origlnal rnaturlty

Short Term Private Sector debts will
be made in 10 equal and successive

before October 1, 1985.

semi-annual payments, beginning
from January 1, 1994.
Late interest accrued as at 31st
December, 1986 will be capitalised
as at this date aM pai<1 according to

the schedule of repayment of

the

original principal.

(c)

100,6

of Post 'tXI Short

Term

Private Sector debts will be paU on
or before November 15, 1987. The
remaining 90% will be paid in six
equal and successive semi-annual

lst

payment to be
made on January 1, 1988 and the
final payment to be made on July 1,

these entities.

1990.

(c) Pre 'U Short Term

Private

(d) Post '85 Short Term

Private

Sector arrears.

payments,

the

(d) Any debt service due and not
paid which is not covered by thls
Agreement will be pakJ not hner
than September 30, 1987.

(e)

The Agreement

requires

5.6.2: AMOUNTS

payment of Moratorium !nterest.

RESCHEDULED:
(a) 100% of Medium Term (Public &
Private of Commercial Credits and
Public Sector Loans (Principal and

5.6.4: Rate of Interest:.

lnterest) (excluding late lnterest
charges) due from September 30,
1986 up to December 31, 1987 will

October 1,1985.
(b) Loans from Govemment or ltc

(b) Payments in respect of Pre '84

States, or with a guarantee of
payment from one or several of

Sector arrears.

(a) Commercial credits guaranteed
or insured by the Govemment or ]tg
agencies havlng origlnal maturlty d
more than 1 ysar contracted before

On the basis of approprhte rnarket
rate.

(c)

Repayment of prlncipal and
interest due as a result of the
consolidation agreement concluded
on December 16, 1986.

(d)
or

Commercial credit guaranto€d
insured by the Govemment or

their agencies having' an

odg[nal
maturity of one ysar or less pursurant

to the arrangemsnt conduded
before December 31, 1988.

5.7.2:

PERIOD

OF

CONSOUDATION:

January

1

1985, -

Aprll30, 1990.

5.7.3: Terms:
(a) 100% of principal and hered of
arnunts due frorn January 1, 1989

to

April 30, 1990 exdudhg lete
interest due frorn Jamnry 1, 1989 to

1S wfl be rcccttcdrlcd or
reflnanced. Repeyrnerls efleAfue
frorn February 28, 1S to August
31, 1S9.
(b) 100% of the prlnclpal and
lntorest ln respect of amounts due
April 30,

as at 31/1?88 and

nd pald on loans

and credftg wll bo rescheddod

rr

reflnanced. Repayment udll be made
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in 10 equal

semi-annual payments
effective from February 28, 1985 to
August31,199.
(c) 100% principal and interest

5.8: PAR.IS CLUB3R.D
RESCHEDULING AGREEMENT

including late interest due as at
31112188 and not paid on the above
debts will be rescheduled or
refinanced. Repayments will be

The date of the Agreement was
January 18, 1991. Nigerian debts
were rescheduled on terms
applicable to Medium lncome,

d

made

in 10 equal semi-annual

payments effective from 30/6/90 to
311121(J4.

(d)

The amounts of principal and of
interests due as at 31fi2lffi and not

paid will be

t99t

heavily indebted Countries of the
lower Category. Congo, Morocco,
Hunduras & El-Salvador had eadier
been accorded the same treatment
by the Paris Club.

rescheduled or

refinanced up to a limit of 6O% of the

total amount due before

3'll'12188.

Repayments will be made in 6 equal
semi-annual payments effective

from 31/1/90 to

3117192. The
remaining amounts of principal and
interest which would exceed 60o,6

will be pald on 31/1/90.

5.8.1: Debts concerned and the terms:

Debts totalling $S.Z billion were
rescheduled as follows:

(a)

$1.8 billion representing 100%

Principal

and lnterest on

non
previously rescheduled debts due
for payment between 1/5/90 and

were rescheduled for 15
years including I years grace period.
3113192

(b)

5.7.4: RATE OF INTEREST:

This will be the appropriate market
rate bilaterally agreed between the
debtor and the creditor countries.

$1.4 billion representing 100%
Principal and lnterest on debts

(b) Debt for aU
(c) Debt for equity &
(d) Debt for local currency
ln the case of ODA loans 100% ol
amount outstanding as at 31/12190
could be converted.
5.8.4: Interest Rate:

lnterest rate on tho amount
rescheduled wtl b€ based on
approprlate rnarket rate.
5.8.5: Time table for palment

of

arrears:-

Arrears as at 30/9/$ to be peld
latest28l2l91

Arrears as at 31/12190

to be pald

latesr 31/5/91

Bilateral Agreements

to

bo

concluded by31st August, 1991.
Reconclliations
b€ concluded

to

latest 31st May, 1991

.

in 1986 maturity

5.8.6: De-minimis Clause:-

between 1/1/91 and 3113192 further
rescheduled for 8 years including 4

milhon to be pald ln cash.

rescheduled

1991

All debts not exceeding

SDR!.S

5.7.5: COMPARABILITY:

years grace period.

The principle of comparability will
apply to all difference categories of

(c) Official Development Assistance

creditors so as to avokl inequality of

rescheduled

treatment.

20 years including 10 years grace

The debt converslon prograrilne
was adopted ln July 1988 to

period.

complement the debt rnanagfipnt

(ODA) Loans
to be

not

previously

rescheduled for

5.7.6: DE-MIMMIS CI-AUSE:

All debts less than

SDR1,000,000

5.8.2: Period of Consoljdation: May

should be paid in cash.

1, 1990 - March 31, 1992.

5.7.7: PRE AND POST CUT-OFF

5.8.3: Voluntary Debt Conversion:

DATEDEBTS:
Debts relating to the agreements
concluded before October 1, 1985
should be rescheduled or
refinanced during the consolidation
period while those relating to the

agreements concluded

after

October 1, 1985 should be pakl in

For the first time, debt conversion

option was introduced on a
voluntary basis. ln the case of
commercial credit 100,6 of amount
outstanding as at 31/12190 subiect
to a maximum of $20 million can be
converted for the following
purposes:

cash as and when due.

(a) Debt for nature

5.9: DEBTCOTWERSION
PR,OGRAMME IN NIGERIT,:

strategles already lmplemented ln
Nigerh. The programme alms at
improving Nigerh's external debt
position by reducing the stock of
outstanding foreign curency
denominated debt ln order to
allevhte the debt servlce burden.
"Other objectlves of the programrne
include the following:

(a) To imprwe the economlc
environment and make lt attractlve
to foreign investors;
(b) To serve as additional lncentfue
for the repatriation of fright capltal;

VOLUME 15NO.2
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stimulate employment

generating investments in industries
with significant dependence on local
inputs;

(d) To

encourage the creation and

development of export-oriented
industries thereby diversifying the

export base

of the Nigerian

economy.

(e) To generate revenue for the
government at the time of

for equity and debt for cash. The
programme was later extended to
debt for debt transactions and as
from 1989 further extended to cover
restructured bank debts and in 1990
to refinanced bank debts.
Under the 3rd Agreement with the
Paris Club in January, 1991, eligible
debt for conversion has also been
extended to cover, on voluntary

conversion and from tax payments

basis, commercial credits and
Official Development Assistance

investments
redemption

(ODA) loans both outstanding as at
3'll12l$. The purposes for which

profitable

on

undertaken

with

proceeds.

(f)

Finally,

the objective is

to
appropriate

the eligible debts could be
converted include debt for nature,

facilitate access to
technology, external market and
other benefits associated with

debt for aid, debt for equity and debt
for local currency.

foreign investment.

5.10: Evaluation of Nigeria's llebt
Management Strategies:

The debt conversion programme in

Nigeria is by auction. There were
only two auctions in 1988 when it
started and the value of promissory

notes redeemed was
million.

ln 1989, there

US$52.61

were eight

auctions with a total value of
US$201.3 million promisory notes
redeemed. Only five auctions were
held in 1990 and a total amount of
US$70.0 million promissory notes
was redeemed. Accordingly, the
aggregate value of promissory notes

redeemed from 1988 - 1990
amounted to US$232.9 million.
Between March, 1986 and March,
1987, there were redemptions of

some

promisory

notes
basis

administratively on ad hoc
amounting to US$5.3 million. lf this
amount redeemed prior to the
commencement of the programme
is taken into consirJeration, the
aggregate amount redeemed as at
the end of 1990 would amount to
US$59.2 million.
Initially, the debt conversion
programme was restricted to debt

Nigeria has adopted various debt

management strategies which are
within the framework of the global
debt relief measures. Essentially,
Nigeria has made use of refinancing,
rescheduling, restructuring and debt
conversion strategies.

ln order to enjoy the benefit of
debt relief, arrears of confirmed
letters of credit atnounting to
US$2,112 million were refinanced in
198i1. Further relief was obtained in
19&4 when trade arrears in respect

of open account, bills for collection,
unconfirmed letters of credit and
some invisible trade transactions
were refinanced through the
issuance of promissory notes. The
value of such promissory notes

issued

in 1984 was US$258.5

million, US$l,050 million in 1985,
US$202 million in 1986, US$1,684

million in 1987 and US$SO million in
1988, all of which amounted to

US$.8 billion.

in

Additional relief was also obtained
1987 under the refinancing and

1991

restructuring of the arrears of letters
of credit and loans totalling US$.6

billion with the London

Club.

Similarly in 1989, the refinanced
letters of credh and restructurd

loans with the London Club
amounted to US$.7 billion ln
March, 1991, agreoment was
reached in principle with the London
Club for the restructurlng of our debt
amounting to about US$5.8 billion
under three options
debt
buyback, collateralised Bonds and
New Money Bonds. The debt
buyback would provide an effective
debt and debt service reduction
relief, Albeit there is a cost outlay for

of

the provision of necessary lunds to

effect the buyback. The
collateralised bonds will also

provide relief in respect of the
contractual interest rate payable,
which is below the market rate.
However, the cost of the inilial cash
outlay for the provision of collateral
should not ignore. The expected
relief from the New Money Bonds
will be the elongated grace period of
10 years repayment. ln addition, the

new money that would be made
available would be used to finance

projects that would promote our
immediate economic growth. lt is
also heartening to note that the debt
under this agreement, like most
other debts except the multilateral
debt, is eligible for debt conversion,
which makes it possible for eventual
cancellation

or

redemption

in

local

currency.

Debt relief was not obtained
through the London Club alone but
also through the Paris Glub, which
was owed more than 50% of our
total e)ilernal debt. ln 1986, there
was a rescheduling agreement with
the Parish oub and the total debt
involved was about US 2,097 million.

Another agreement was reached
with the Paris Club in 1989 in

4t

VOLUME

15

NO.2

APRIUJUNE

respect of arrears of debt totalling

US$995 million. The

recent
agreement with the same Paris Club
was in.Jantnry, 1991 when a total of
US$.2 billion was rescheduled.
It wotdd be recalled that, as part of
Nigeria's overall debt relief, the

aggregate amount of promissory
notes redeemed under the debt

conversion programme

was

US$59.2 million as at the end of
1990.

Apparently, these strategies have
had some salutary sffects on our
external debt burden. For example,
our debt service ratio fell from 33.8%
in 1984 to be.g% in 1985 and further
declined to 32.60,6 in 1986, from
which year it dropped to 13.3% in
1987 (See Appendix 3). However, as
a result of uncleared arrears of
accumulated debts and the addition
of new loans, the debt service ratio
in 1988 rose to 29.O%. There was an

improvement in the debt service
ratio in 1989 when it fell to 21.306. lt
is needless to stress that but for the
relief measures, the debt ssrvice
burden would have been, heavier
aM more excruchting. The relief
has also been favourably reflected in
our real Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) which grew by 1.7% in 1987,
4.2%in 1988,4.1% ln 1989 and 5.2%

conspicuous

particular reference to United States
of America and France in the former,
as well as Venezuela and Zambh in
the laner. Part ll examined the origin
and structure of Nigeria's external
debt. Part lll of the paper tracd the
Nigeria's
causative lactors
external debt without ignoring her

present mood

of

external borrowing policy. Part lV
highlighted the various debt relief
proposals and focused the Nigeria's

Debt relief measures, however,
have their own limitations. They can

only provide a respite to our debt
problems. Our debt problems have
fundamental causes which should
be attacked more dfectively at the
root.

SUMMARY
The introductory part of this paper
has addressed the basic concept of
debt Management. Part I of the

of

global

and

ostentatious

life-style should soberly rellect the

of th€ economy.

Above all, we should produce more

goods adequate for both loca!
consumption and exports. Our
non-oil export base shorild bo
approprhtely dtuersified so as to
significantly increase (xrr nonoll
export earnings. There shottld be a
shift from the nations's hvourlte

merchandlsing

to large scale

external debt profile. Part V
discussed in details the debt

rnanufacturing. Our lndustrlal Pdlcy
Programme shor{d be vlgixo.rsly
pursued and the prfuate sector

strategies.

growth.

management strategies in Nigeria
and made an evaluation of such

ln order to be relieved of our debt

problem, many people

had

advocated debt cancellation, debt
forgiveness and debt write-off by our
creditors as well as debt repudiation
by this country. The demerits in
these lines of action are that they

would impair the nation's

credft

worthiness, erode the confidence of
the international community in our

oconomy and probably portray us
as a bankrupt nation. Moreover, in
the case of a unilateral repudiation

of our debt, the international
community might react by
"attaching"

our foreign assets

(external reserves).

in 1990.

paper had an. overview

in both developed and
developing economies with
debts

1991

should be more lnvolved ln the
promotion of sustainaue economlc

Finally, we cannot over-stress the

need for national sconomlc

self-relhnce. ln order to achla/e
self-rellance, all hands should be on
deck to revltalise the economyi and
all these tnnds should start from the
boardroom to the shopfloor, and
from the socio-political lvory tower
to the grassroot. Also, slnce the
bane of our scorx)rny ln the last two
decades has been poor economlc
rnanagoment, for which we are
peylng moot deerly, we should now

resolve whh absdute sonse d
commhment to rnanagp the
economy prudently and use the

availaUe resources ludlclously.

While it is appreciated that any of
the above mentioned consijerations

might give us the much needed
relief, it might turn to be merely a
palliative in the shorUmedium term
and not a long-term panacea to our
debt problems. ln order to have a
permanent solution to our chronic
debt problems, we must cultivate
the spirit of nationalism, patrotism
and selfless service to the nation.
Our anitude to work must improve
so as to enhance our productivity.
We should all have integrity which

we should be proud of.

Our
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Debt Service, and Growth lndexes for the SlMlCs, Nigeria, and the StLlCs
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Debt

Debt outstandinq, 1989
Total
Total private
(USfb) sources (?)

Country

Argentina

64.7
4.4

Bolivia
Brazil

111.3

Chile

18.

Congo

Costa Rica
Cote d'lvorre
Ecuador

2

4.3
4.5
15.4
11.3

8l

4

l8

3

73 0
67 I

4l
6l

Hondu ra's

3.4
20.6
9s.6
20.9
9.2

l8

Hungary

Nicaragua
Peru

Philippines
Poland
Senegal
U

ruguay

Venezuela
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Nigeria
SlLlCs

SOURCEI

t GNP I ntertst /exports
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0

I
I

I 19.7
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5

7

24. I

I 6
0

1

0

2

91 .2

0

5

1.0
3.0
0. r
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0

5
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6
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23 q

1
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q

17 7

Mexico
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0.3
0.4

6
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0.3
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47 4
s8 9

Egypt

De b

2

1

5

0

1

1

5

9

3

Average annual growth rates
I 932-89 (pe rcent p.a)
lnsert Per capital

Debt lndicators
I 989 (percent)

Debt Servrce, 1989
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I nterest
( ussb)
US$b)

l 989
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6
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9
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0
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0

25 5

I

9

4

0

.8

3 6

ll

t8

47 0

2

2

65.7

17

I

I

43.

3l

5

1.5

0

9

68.

3

5

3

0 3

6

I

0.q
0.6
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32.8
107.9
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0
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NIGERIAIS EXTER}IAI IIEBT PNOTILE USI (ITIIJIOIT)
NIGERIA

(US$

ml1l1on, unless otherwise indicated)

1970 1980 i982 1983 1984 l98s 1986 1987 1988
I.
TOTAL DEBT STOCKS (EDT)

SUilAIT DEIT DADI

-

8,934 t2,954 18,539 19,537 19,551 24,043 3I,lg3 3L,947 32,832
10,419 13,481 12,793 14,555 20,324 29,532 30,240 ?2,074

452

4,284

9, 106 12,181

1,097

I,313

56t' 5,38I

tong-tern debt (LDOD)
Publlc and pub1lc1y
guarantccd

ll5

Prlvate nonguaranteed
Use of IMF credlt
Short-term debt
Interest drrears on LDOD
TOTAL DEBT

0

0

3,553
0

I1,393 13,140 L9,724 28,980 29,7O3

759

5I5

1,753
1,753

3,724

2,981

1,659
1,659

L,347
1,347

1,358
1,358

I ,525

2,981

2,023
2,023

L,O24

3,724

I ,024

I ,525

9

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

58

243
243

84r
84r

L,L62

2,225
2,225

2,7 68
2,7 68

L,245

445
445

644
644

485

L,L62

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

I ,510

2,883

I ,818

-202

-46s

|,44L

L,795

625

643

I ,340

)
3 ,043
2, 130

I,415

-4 r5

68
0
22

of which Short-term debt
Interest payments (INT)
Long-term debt
IMF charges

L,25L

I ,418

815

593

1,475

l,3ll

873

998

L,949
L,249

1,735

531

L,299

515

s53

I ,435

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

9

378

420

700

436

300

40

40

3l

599

1,631

40r -2,150 -2,200
2,580 4,17 4 4,502
2,L60 3,474 4,066

627

2,450

319

2,060

,038

2,LzO
2,060

-686
L,196
L,765

I,I53 2,092
L,7 L4

96

774

0

0

0

0

0

379

378

420

700

Short-tern debt (lnt.only)

1

I,760

998

NET TRANSFERS

0

0

0

0

436

300

40

40

3r

9
4
40
0
7
3
5
205 -740 433 345 200 478 t67
-207-t,357 1,738 805 -l ,535 -2,347 -493
3.

Gross naticnal product
Exports of goods and

(GNP)

(XGS)

Imports of goods & servs.
(MGS)

International resewes (RES)
current account balance

14

603

260

798

3,236

38C

I ,040

42
377
-97 3

2,082

tl4
935

}IA"IOR ECONO}IIC AGGNEGTTES

13,170 99,539 9I,715 88,468 91,590 88,167 45,649 23,013 27,855 27,5L5

L,341 27,749 12,897 I0,855 12,350 13,520 6,318 7,818 7,304 8,4L7

r,772 22,044 L9,753 14,8I4 1I,909 I0,689

224 lO,640 L,926 L,252 L,674 1,892
-368 5,L27 -7,285 -4,354 rl5 2,566
4

EDT/XGS(Z)

32

2

100.4

9 0

4.1

4 2

r70.8
21. 0
23. I
13. I

r50. I
20. )

t44. 6

rNr/xcs (z)

3 3

6.2
9.7

INT/

0 9

1.4

l. 6

I

I 4.9

6. 8

1.2

I. 0

9 0
7

9.6
3.4
5.7

27. 3

31 0

25. 5

Z)

RES/EDT(Z)

19

1.5

5 8

Short-rerm/EDT (Z)
Concessional/EDT (Z)

39 8

llulrilareraliEDT(Z)

6 4

6

1

I

SOURCE: WORLD DEBT TABLE, 1990-9I V0LUI{E

5

I

834
350
366

7

I

g 7,483 8,652
8 933 2,041
-6 9 -194 -143
85
49

DEBT INDIC.ATORS

22. ')
33. 3
12. 8
2. 0
9. 7
2. I

EDT/GNP ( Z)
TDS/XGS (Z)

(uronths)

,280

0

2. AGGREGATE NET RESOI'BCB FLffiS AIID NET ITAI|STERS (I.0NC-TEII{)
NET RESOURCE FLOWS
259 773 3,320 2,L63
5 -627 278 1,530
Net flow long-tern debt
(ex.IMF)
t3 I,510 2,883 1,818 -202 -L,t09 102 914
Grants (excluding tech. asst.)
Direct forelgn lnvest (net)

485

9Il
'37

Long-term debt
IMF repurchases & charges

|,245

28

Short-tern debt
Net transfers on debt
Tota1 debt servlce (TDS)

RES/McS

406

ET

90

IMF purchases
Prlncipal repayments
Long-term debt
IllF repurchases
Net flow on debt

GNP (

31,66E

,300 I ,400 I ,4 16 600 552 537
0
0000000
2,535 5,059 5,744 4,995 3,7L9 1,66I L,707
l6
10 56
79
66 763 L,047
I

FLOWS

Dlsbursemrnts
Long term debt

servlces

l9E9

2

,)

33. 8

l5

8

2

I

I

5

2

2

L. 3

4. 8

5

2

7.

3

s 399.0
52, 7 135.2

380.

6
12. 9
l. 8
5. 6
Z. 8
15. s
, 3
9. 3
1a

13.3

7.6

2.6
4.8
2.3
5.3
2.0
9.8

4
7
29. 0
20. 2
5. 3
.,
9
I. 5
3
l. 9
8. 9

437 .

390. r

114.

119.

E

3

21.3
15.6

4.8
6.2
2.8
2.3

t.7
9.5

